IISSM Conference Delhi Dec 12-14 2007
Security Industry on the Threshold of Changes



Paper
Challenges for Aviation Security in the
Changing Security Scenario



Assoc Prof Kerran Campbell



Campbell & Campbell Security Consultants
P.O.Box 126 Mosman Park 6912 Western Australia
Ph/Fax +61893833104 Mob +61418945336
Email: k.campbell@camx2.com - Web: camx2.com

Introduction

Aviation security is currently in turbulent times. These times have become even more turbulent since 9/11, and as a result of the constantly changing threat environment there have been significant changes to the international regulations that apply to a state’s aviation policies. International regulations have always followed the various threats that have materialised, however since 9/11 the pace of the appearance of the varying threats has the regulatory environment playing catch up.

Any Airports security policy and its corresponding infrastructure is not something that can accommodate these changes as swiftly as are being demanded by these turbulent times.

Airport security policies and the effect they have on a states Aviation safety are a function of a much wider regularity frame work, the elements of which are to some degree interdependent on one another. Changes in one element can impact on other elements of the security and safety solution with consequential knock-on effects.

The challenges to aviation safety and security are manyfold, and there is a need to ensure that the policies and infrastructure available are utilised to their optimum. This paper explores three of these elements:

• Optimising effectiveness of security guards
• The passenger screening environment
• Airport Perimeter Security

Optimising effectiveness of the Guard-force

The whole process of the application of security across the whole airport campus relies on the guard-force the security guards and or police made up of both men and women who actually deliver the service.

The guard-force are the foot soldiers who actually:

• Deliver the protection of the airports fixed and operational infrastructure,
• Maintain the security and separation of areas,
• Secure the baggage or cargo which is placed on the aeroplane,
• Screen the passengers prior to them boarding the aircraft.

All of the above is carried out under a regulatory framework that is implemented by the contracted state to meet the states obligations, being a signatory to ICAO. Each contracting state will have a National Aviation Security Aviation Policy. This policy provides the overarching framework in determining how the contracting state achieves it ICAO obligations, as well as shaping the strategic directions taken in implementing the policy.

There are some generic threats that apply to all contracting states. These are defined in the various annexes of the ICAO documents. How these threats materialise however can vary from one state to another. The risk assessment process is used to define the security and safety requirements of any contracting state. The risk process will help refine the specific safety and security needs in global terms for the contracting state, and then further refine the needs for individual airports within that state.

It is possible that there will be wide variance of the safety and security needs across the contracting state, this means the airport security plan, and hence the underpinning processes and procedures for each airport will vary.

Notwithstanding the derivation of these procedures ultimately, their implementation will be by the guard force. The security management determines the direction that the guard-force will implement the strategies developed and as well oversee the quality of what is implemented, however it is the guard force that is responsible for the implementation, and hence it is ultimately the diligence of how that guard-force performs its task on which the success of the complete program relies.

2.1 Security management structure
Each Airport will have a security management structure which will oversee and implement the safety and security requirements of the Airport Security Program (ASP) as well as co-ordinate the security programs of all other stakeholders. There is a nominal structure of committees and other management nominees required by ICAO. However exactly how the safety and security program is implemented is determined by the ASP, itself being dependent of the requirements of the particular airport in question. Regardless of the size of the Airport, ultimately it is the security guard-force who deliver the actual safety and security service and, carry out the vital interaction with the travelling public.

The ASP must therefore have a mechanism that empowers the guard force and the guard force supervision to be able to ensure the tasks they undertake are correctly authorised and can be undertaken with confidence.

2.2 Current issues with the security guard-force
World wide today there is a problem with attracting sufficiently qualified and motivated staff to operate the guard force. Due to the costs of the guard force, generally the guards are not, by comparison with, other staff or operatives in the airport are not well remunerated. Indeed regardless of whether the guard-force are either private or specific arms of government, the security guard-force are one of the least paid employees on the airport campus, yet the success of the implementation of the Safety and Security of the complete airport lies in the hands of these people.

If these people do not do their job correctly the complete program is in jeopardy.

Other issues that impact on the guard force are:

• They generally are looked down upon by other law enforcement operatives on the Airport – Other groups of operatives tend not to recognise the responsibilities held and the role played by both the static guards and the screening staff of the guard force. This impacts on the self esteem of the guard force, and is a contributing factor to the turnover of guard-force staff.

• They have to deal with the travelling public who are often aggressive and hostile for reasons that have nothing to do with the guard force – Often the security guards who perform the security screening role are subjected to hostile behaviour and abuse by passengers, whose behaviour has been generated by forces outside of the control of the guard-force. This can be generated by changes in airline schedules, problems with airport vendors and/or parking infrastructure, it can also be triggered by changes to security regulations and procedures etc. The screening staff have to manage this behaviour and yet still maintain the vigilance required of their post. Often being continuously subjected to this atmosphere of aggression also contributes to the turnover of guard-force staff.

• They have to manage their working program to meet the changing schedules of an operational Airport – The guard-force in airports usually have to manage shift work, often with a roster that changes constantly to meet the schedules of airlines. Also because the guard-force operates often with a transient workforce as well as being subjected to relatively high turnover, their roster is often modified to match and or supplement the experience of the screening team. This has a consequential disruption on their personal lives.

• Training and up-skilling of staff to meet the changing threat environment – As the regulatory framework is constantly changing, the guard-force is constantly having to modifying procedures to meet these varying threats.

• Guards who do not remain long in the role - There is a relatively high turnover of guards who operate in aviation security, and particularly those involved in screening. Each guard involved in aviation, and particularly those involved in screening require specific training in addition to the general security training. As additional threats are identified additional training is required. Therefore there is a significant investment involved in aviation security guards, and again particularly those involved in screening. The loss of a guard is a loss of the investment made in the guard.
  
  In view of this airport managers need to review those factors that impact on the retention of these guards in its important role.

Rarely is the airport security infrastructure able to be modified to cater for the changes to the threat. The investments made in airport security infrastructure is usually significant. Once purchased and installed, there is a finite life of the equipment for which an economic return must be obtained. Therefore even though there is equipment available that may assist in meeting the threat in a more efficient manner, the economic rational will not allow this to occur. It is then incumbent on the security guard-force utilising security and other techniques to compensate to ensure the minimum security criteria can be achieved. To ensure this occurs in the most effective manner the guard-force must be constantly retrained to ensure the additional methods and techniques’ required to mitigate the new threats are available to those members of the guard-force who perform those tasks.

2.3 Addressing Guard-force issues.
There is a need for airport management to address the issue of the role played by the security guard-force in the safety and security of airports. There is a need for not only airport management but also but also the travelling public to recognise the significant contribution that the grassroots guard-force makes to the aviation industry. Without the guard-force contracting states would not be able to meet their obligations to ICAO, and consequently would be unable to participate in the Global Aviation Industry.

The prime issues to be addressed include:

• The base remuneration, and particularly the relativity of the Guard-force pay scales to other staff in the airport
• Implementing an awareness program to inform all those who operate in the Airport, as well as the travelling public, the important role the security guard-force plays in the successful operation of the Airport.
• Provide training for the guard force in public relations, to assist them to deal with irate members of the travelling public.
• Train the guard-force to enable them to meet the changes to their procedures to counter the varying threats.

The issue of providing a reliable and competent guard-force who will have job satisfaction provided in both monetary terms as well as recognition for the very important task they perform will assist ensuring the long term viability of the aviation Industry.

3. Screening processes

The process of screening passengers into the sterile zone, regardless of whether the screening occurs at either a centralised point or at the departure gate is one of the most important security functions undertaken in an airport. There are reports in the media almost on a weekly basis of failures that occur in either real or simulated situations at airport security checkpoints, although the majority of failures are not reported.

The passenger screening checkpoint is a pivotal element in the protection of the aeroplane, and with issue of suicide complicating the threat this check point is becoming even more important.

3.1 Screening guards
The success of the screening checkpoint is totally reliant on the guards that perform the screening process. These guards utilise a number of very sophisticated tools in the form of walk through and hand held magnetometers, X-ray equipment and in some contracting states explosives detection equipment. Notwithstanding the availability of these tools, it is the screening guards who with their skill and experience become the final arbiter of whether a person is considered a threat to the aeroplane.

In view of this it is vital that the screening guards are afforded every opportunity to make the decision as to who may be considered a threat in a clear and rational manner. Incorrect decisions can promulgate outcomes that can range from adversely impacting on the passenger facilitation to possibly disastrous consequences.

3.1.1 Screening procedures
The airport security plan will have an element that defines the security procedures that apply at the airports in question. Often the contracting state will define the method of screening to be applied, however these procedures must in almost every case be tailored to the particular airport where the screening is delivered.

The procedures can vary to take into account the:

• Specific screening equipment used
• The particular threats the risk assessment has identified
• The specific requirements of the country the aeroplane will land in
• The configuration of the screening technology and furniture
• The physical environment the screening check point is located

Of the above, the first three items are elements that have little effect on the ability of the screening staff to perform their task. Most screening equipment in the majority of contracting states is of such a standard that it can perform the tasks for which the equipment was procured. This of course assumes the equipment is maintained and tested in accord with ICAO requirements. However there are currently threats that the equipment cannot detect, and the screening process is then supplemented by additional practices and supporting procedures to manage these particular threats. When a contracting state, where the aeroplane will land, poses additional constraints for screening passengers, these again are managed by additional practices and supporting procedures to ensure these requirements are implemented.

The last two items of the above list however can significantly impact on the outcomes achieved by the screening guards, and are items over which the Airport authorities have some control.

3.1.2 Optimal performance of screening guards
During the IRA troubles in the Northern Ireland, a 23-year-old statement from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) gives us an insight into the terrorist mindset. After a failed attempt on the life of Margaret Thatcher, the IRA said in a public statement “Today we were unlucky. But remember, we only have to get lucky once. You have to get lucky every day.”

In the case of the Airport screening guard we cannot rely on luck! The guard must be vigilant ALL of the time. Therefore we must give the screening guard the tools to be able to perform at an optimum level for the complete time they are performing the screening tasks.

Guards are human, like the rests of us. Their task is repetitive and could even be considered boring yet we demand of them 100% at all times. Very often however we do not provide the environment to facilitate the task they undertake. We provide more conducive conditions for the task at hand to office workers, than we do screening guards that provide a service that is vital to the safety of extremely expensive pieces of equipment which carry up to many hundred human lives.

3.1.3 Senses used in screening
All screening staff use two prime senses in performing their roles in the screening process. Sight and hearing!

The first is sight. Screening staff use sight to:

• Analyse the images presented on the X-ray system
• Monitor the visual representation of the walk through metal detector detecting metal being passed through the device
• Monitor the visual representation on the handheld metal detector when detecting the quanta of metal in proximity to the device
• Monitor the visual results presented on the Explosive Detection Device (if used)
• Monitor the flow of passengers through the boundary of the sterile zone
• Monitor the integrity of the boundary of the sterile zone
• Monitor the facial expression of the passengers as they pass through the screening process
• Monitor the body language of passengers as they pass through the sterile zone
• Monitor the interaction of passengers as they pass through the sterile zone.

Secondly hearing. Screening staff use hearing to:

• Monitor the audio representation of the walk through metal detector, when detecting metal being passed through the device
• Monitor the audio representation on the handheld metal detector detecting the quanta of metal in proximity to the device
• Monitor the audio results presented on the Explosive Detection Device (if used)
• Monitor the direct verbal interaction between screening staff and passengers as they pass through the sterile zone.
• Monitor verbal interaction between passengers as they pass through the sterile zone
• Monitor the verbal interaction of passengers as they pass through the sterile zone.

Many security guards who are involved in the screening process are of middle age or even older, and generally whose sight and hearing is not all it could be anyway.

The sight and hearing of the screening guards can be either supported by, or adversely affected by the architectural and/or engineering services environment of the area where the screening takes place.

In many airports the location where screening process occurs were not originally designed as screening check points. In fact many airports did not have screening when they were designed or constructed. In view of this these areas do not provide the optimal environment to support the guards undertaking the screening process

3.1.4 Issues that can impact on guards performing the screening process

• Planning of the screening areas - The layout of the screening equipment to enable orderly flow of passengers, and facilitating the sight lines for security guards in the screening process.

• The type and heights of furniture – The screening furniture should be ergonomically deigned to ease the physical burden of the screening staff during the time of their shift

• Physical surfaces – The wall floor and ceiling surfaces of the screening area should be of the type that will support appropriate audio environment. The physical surfaces should minimise reverberation time and suppress unwanted audio reflections. In addition the surfaces should also be treated with both texture and colour to fulfil support of the illumination environment.

• Appropriate illumination to enable the guards to:
  

  • Conduct the screening process without eye strain
  • Examine the X-ray screen without unwanted reflections and screen glare
  • See the visual representation of alarms from the security equipment
  • See the faces and bodies of passengers as they pass through the screening process
  • View subtle movements of and between passengers as they pass through the screening process
  • Be able to search the bags of Passengers

• Appropriate ventilation as a minimum, or preferably air-conditioning to ensure the optimal conditions for screening staff – The guards need an environment that is allows them to perform a pedantic task at maximum concentration. If the temperature and humidity of the screening area is to high it will impact on the long term efficiency of the screening staff. It will also impact on the passengers, and their consequent demeanour during the screening process, however they are usually in there only for a small time, the guards can be there for a complete shift.

The airport management must ensure that the screening check point has the physical attributes and engineering services to allow the screening guards to undertake their tasks in a manner so that the travelling passengers and crew will be lucky ALL of the time.

4. Protecting the perimeter

The perimeter of the airport is now seen as a weaker link to gain access to the aeroplane than the passenger terminal. As more resources are applied to the protection of the terminal and specifically the screening into the sterile zone the airport perimeter security is becoming a more attractive option.

Many airport perimeters are at best only token efforts to secure the airports perimeters. ICAO requires an appropriate physical barrier, however because of the size of most airports, with perimeters measured in the tens of kilometres, the barriers in many cases consist of cyclone mesh fences with barbed wire topping. The barriers are often old, and in various states of disrepair. Many barriers located in operational areas or having surveillance roads immediately adjacent have been impacted by airport vehicles, which have impacted the fence, and distorted the mesh, and many cases breached it. Often repairs to the barrier are undertaken by general maintenance staff, whose security knowledge is limited, and over long periods of time the barriers security effectiveness is significantly diminished.

There have also been reported significant breaches of the perimeters resulting in attempted stowaways, or even vandalism to aircraft. These types of breaches of the airports security could easily have resulted in the destruction of an aeroplane, or vital elements of the airports infrastructure.

4.1 Physical barrier
Airports worldwide are commencing re-evaluation of the airports perimeter barrier. Maintaining the integrity of the Airside/Landside boundary is paramount to the security of the Airport. The type of barrier to be utilised for any one particular airport should, as noted previously in this paper, be based on a thorough risk assessment of the perimeter needs. The risk assessment will determine the threats that apply and therefore the most appropriate barrier to be used. The threat assessment should incorporate cognisance of the adjacent geography, and the supporting terrain.

As a result of the assessment a decision can then be made as to the type of barrier to be implemented.

The barriers can vary from a single cyclone style barrier enhanced with barbed wire topping to dual cyclone mesh barriers to single solid style barriers consisting of palisade or heavy mesh to in some elements concrete walls.

Clearly the size of an airport perimeter has an impact of the type of barrier to be employed. Whilst it is possible to employ any type of barrier around the complete perimeter, the economics make this impractical, hence most airport perimeters utilise the minimum barriers that can meet the outcomes of the risk assessment.

It must be accepted that most airport barriers are minimal in the “real” security protection they provide. Cyclone barriers can be penetrated in seconds with a pair of wire cutters, can usually be burrowed under in a short period of time, or climbed over with simple aids in seconds.

There is only so much that can be achieved by any barrier. Regardless of the barriers size and physical characteristics, unless the barrier is constantly monitored the reality is it is vulnerable to be breached. Therefore the time available to those who breach the barrier to undertake their objectives it relates to the frequency of the surveillance of the barrier. This, depending on the risk assessment will determine whether this situation is acceptable. If not then other security measures will be required.

The perimeter barrier must be accompanied by a perimeter road preferable on both sides, or if not both at least on the secure side. The road must be all weather and of such design and construction will allow the response force to use relatively high speed to attend a breach. With perimeter lengths of the tens of kilometres, having to travel half the distance of the perimeter could involve distances of ten plus kilometres to reach a breach, even averaging sixty kilometres an hour (which is significant on these types of roads) the time to reach a breach ten kilometres is some ten minutes away. In security terms, a very long time. Some would argue too long.

4.2 Technology support
Assuming the barrier cannot be physically upgraded to that required by the risk assessment then consideration should be given to the enhancement of the barrier with intrusion detection technology.

The application of security technology to any perimeter is an extremely difficult task. External perimeter security technology is one if not the difficult design exercises that can be undertaken in security.

The majority of perimeter detection sensors are sensing minute changes from a predetermined threshold of some physical phenomena. This can be sensing of sound, motion or of changes in variance of cameras perception or shades of grey/colour in CCTV systems.

In all cases the success of any perimeter security technology is dependent on firstly the probability of detection. This is the ability of the systems to detect the change in level of the phenomena on which the system operates. The second element of success is to minimise the nuisance and false alarm rates. These rates are the propensity of the system to initiate:

• Nuisance alarm rate – these are alarms that are caused by the physical environment in which the technology is installed. They may be initiated by flora or fauna, elements of the weather and physical incompatibilities of the technologies physical installation that causes alarms to be triggered.

• False alarm rate – these are alarms that are caused by faults of the technology, either by problems manifested by the technology itself, or the way the equipment is installed and or configured.

The effectiveness of any perimeter security technology is achieved by a balancing of these two characteristics.

Most systems have the ability to tune the phenomena to an optimum. The optimum involves balancing the probability of detection against the nuisance and false alarm rates.

4.2.1 Technology options
The prime types of perimeter security technologies available are limited to about eleven technologies – these are:

• Taut wire technologies
• Buried line sensor systems
• Capacitance systems
• Microwave systems
• Microphonic cable systems
• Passive infrared systems
• Pulsed infrared systems
• Seismic systems
• Fibre optic sensor systems
• Micro-radar systems
• Video motion detection systems

There are other technologies, and variances of the above generic groups, however in the main these are the prime technologies used in most perimeters systems.

All of the above have differing attributes that make them applicable to specific solutions. What is implicit however that there is no one technology that can be installed in any application. The physical characteristics of the perimeter, and the physical environment in which the systems are installed will have a significant impact on which technology is employed.

There is not time available to explore the characteristics of these technologies within this paper however it is suffice to say that each has characteristics that will lean towards that technology being more applicable to one application than another.

One relatively recent additions to a number of the above technologies is the use of time domain reflectomatory. This enables the technology to indicate in explicit terms the exact location of the breach, rather than indicating which zone the breach is occurring, which may be tens or hundreds on metres long.

4.2.2 Integrated solution
Regardless of the technology selected the technology must be integrated into an holistic perimeter solution. The solution must include the flowing elements:

• The monitoring of the solution in the man-machine interface.
• Integration of the technology into an appropriate perimeter barrier
• Supporting power and communications infrastructure
• Appropriate perimeter illumination (if required)
• Appropriate visual monitoring (if provided)
• An appropriate and timely response force.

The solution must be able to counter the threats that are identified by the risk assessment. The solution considers all of the items above and must ensure that there are no weak links in the security chain for which the technology was provided.

4.2.3 CCTV support
Most high security perimeters have as a support CCTV of some form to enable the evaluation of alarms that occur to preclude the need to respond to every alarm.

However in the case of the perimeter of an airport where perimeter lengths measure in tens of kilometres, full CCTV coverage in the traditional perimeters security sense with cameras each monitoring individual zones of some 100 meters is generally considered too costly to contemplate.

There are however new technologies where long range PTZ cameras can be integrated into a solution, providing the technology employed on the perimeter can identify the breach within meters.

These cameras currently are, by comparison with current technology extremely expensive. However when compared with achieving similar coverage with conventional technology the costs are often comparable.

CCTV support with digital recording provides a valuable tool to monitor any breach or attempted breach for the perimeter.

4.2.4 Man machine interface
The monitoring of any airport perimeter is a vital element of the perimeter security solution. The control room is the location where the man is presented the data which is generated by the machine. Based on the data presented the guard will then make decisions as to what response to initiate.

The presentation of the data must be clear and simplified to the point that the data will enable immediate assessment of the situation with consequential response. If the perimeter data is supported by CCTV the presentation of the CCTV information must be integrated with the detection technologies to enable a cohesive presentation of the visual as well as the detection data.

The man-machine interface must be supported with appropriate communications to enable guidance of any response force.

4.2.5 Response force
The perimeters should be monitored by both regular and random patrols. These patrols must be in constant communications with the control room, and can be able to respond to any alarm signalled that requires their attendance.

The response vehicles can be enhanced with GPS technology which can be displayed in the control room which will allow more accurate guidance by the control room guards for the response force to breach.

In addition the vehicle can be equipped with technology that emulates the readout of the technology in the control room, which allow more rapid response of the breach.

Regardless of the support the response force must be experienced and familiar with the perimeter, particularly:

• The areas of airport and aviation infrastructure within the perimeter that could be a target
• Any areas within the perimeter that could afford cover to those perpetrating a breach
• All internal roads that might enable expediting access to a breach
• All security restricted areas

The above knowledge provided with specific driver response will ensure the guards that perform this role become an integrated element of the perimeter security solution.

5. Summary
The challenges facing aviation are increasing and multi faceted. The more aviation becomes a vital element of the economic development of the western world, the greater a target it will become.

The challenges since 9/11 will increase. To counter the threats posed will require constant vigilance. The three areas covered in this paper are only a small number of those identified in my recent work in AVSEV. Notwithstanding, these three are significant elements that need addressing by the airport authorities as part of their airport security plan.

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The Lord's Trick

Situated on the banks of the Ganges near holy Rishikesh in the Himalayas, there was once an ashram that had attracted a fair number of seekers due to the holiness of its presiding monk. The guru would take in all seekers who wanted to learn a life of dedication to God; but such was his love that he often did not discriminate who he allowed to stay.

After some time, he noticed that the ashramites were often quarrelling and he could hear rude words that left him pained. 'Why are they angry with one another?' the guru asked himself. But he could not bring himself to throw anyone out - such was his compassion. One day he saw two inmates fighting over food in the ashram canteen. The incident left him shocked and he returned to his hut in a despondent mood. 'What can be wrong with them?' he asked himself. He was racked with the problem of remedying the situation and elevating their souls. So, he increased his discourses to them and gave more personal advice on their sadhana. The inmates' reverence for their guru increased, but unfortunately this did not translate in better behaviour towards each other. The guru, then resolved to practise penance and ask the Lord for divine help before matters could get any worse. So, he shut himself away in his hut for a week, maintained silence and took a reduced diet. After some days of intense prayers and meditation, he was rewarded with a vision of celestial light. The guru was transfixed in bliss as the Lord's nectarine voice came through the light: "My child, my dear child." The guru could not believe his ears. He was thrilled to hear the sweet voice. "Is it really you, my Lord?" he asked filled with ecstasy and disbelief. "Yes, my child," God said lovingly. "Tell me, what can I do for you?" The Guru prostrated to the Divine voice and said, "Dear Lord, be pleased to come to my ashram." "What for?" the Voice asked. "You know everything, Lord," the guru humbly submitted. "Yet, I shall say it. The members of the ashram hate one another; they are jealous of each other. Lord, if you come and stay with us for a week, they will be filled with pure and noble thoughts." The kind lord replied, "Certainly, I will come, but not for one week, but for ever." The guru's joy knew no bounds. But the Voice continued, "But only on one condition." "What is it, my Lord," the guru asked eagerly. "I will come, but not in this form," the Lord clarified. "I will always be at the ashram in the guise of one of the inmates. I shall always be moving in the hearts of one of them; it could be anyone of them."



With these words, the Light disappeared.

The Guru, after recovering from that ethereal experience, o pened the door of his hut and called all the ashramites to assemble. When he informed them of God's wish to abide in their hearts they rejoiced, but they were confused too. "Is this inmate sitting near me God in disguise?" one disciple thought. "Who could be 'God in disguise' person?" Nobody knew and everybody was left guessing and as a result careful too. For, each one thought, "How can I fight against anyone here? What if he is one in whom God is there now?" And thus, a subtle change slowly came over in each one of them. They began to see God in everyone and took every opportunity to help the other and be kind and courteous. The whole atmosphere in the ashram was now totally transformed – only love and harmony prevailed. The guru was the happiest man now. The Lord's trick had done wonders. If we reflect, we can make our family, our society and our earth just like this ashram – full of peace and harmony – if only we believe and practise the feeling that each one is just God in a different form. Our life would become a sweet experience, every moment.

Email dated April 3, 2008 from Sysman Computer Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai

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